



OXFORD JOURNALS  
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

---

Local Attachments, National Identities and World Citizenship in the Thought of Thomas Paine

Author(s): Ian Dyck

Source: *History Workshop*, No. 35 (Spring, 1993), pp. 117-135

Published by: Oxford University Press

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4289209>

Accessed: 07/01/2010 16:14

---

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).



Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *History Workshop*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

## SPECIAL FEATURE

# INTERNATIONALISM



## Local Attachments, National Identities and World Citizenship in the Thought of Thomas Paine

*by Ian Dyck*

The bicentenary of the publication of Thomas Paine's *Rights of Man* (1791–2) has come and gone, silently and obscurely. No new monuments to Paine were unveiled (even the Post Office got into the spirit of things by refusing to issue a commemorative stamp)<sup>1</sup> and conservative historians continued to poke at British radical traditions with evidence of 'popular' opposition to Paine's politics. Tributes to Paine, so frequently encountered only a decade ago, are now sparing, perfunctory and as often in the gift of the Right as of the Left. Tony Benn remains an ardent admirer (Paine 'was so clear, so right and centuries ahead of his time')<sup>2</sup> and so too does the former United States President Ronald Reagan, who delights in his quotations from *Common Sense*: 'we have it in our power to begin the world over again.'<sup>3</sup> Which world, one wonders?

Competing nationalisms – some of the Left, others of the Right – are now the primary custodians of Paine's legacy. Many Asians and Latin Americans invoke his memory in the cause of national liberation and democratic renewal. The French, though usually cautious towards the politics of non-nationals, have long since incorporated Paine into their national repertoire of 14 July. Citizens of the United States (except for the religious fundamentalists who still share Theodore Roosevelt's contempt for the 'filthy little atheist') regularly honour Paine at home and school as a 'great

American'; they are also obedient to the imperative of the American Thomas Paine Association, namely that 'Tom should be honored every July Fourth!'<sup>4</sup> National calendars have even determined Paine's reception at the headquarters of the United Nations. There, five years ago, Paine scholars and disciples from around the world were invited to offer their thoughts on Paine's internationalism. The tributes revolved, as it happened, around Paine's contributions to *national* revolutions, especially in France and the United States.<sup>5</sup>

Britons, even if they drape Paine in the language of democracy and republicanism, cannot construe him as a champion of the British 'people', 'identity' or 'nation'. This is especially awkward for those of us who identify with the British Left. We know intuitively that British radicalism owes much to Paine, but we find no comforts in his writings for Little Englanders, for merely notional internationalists, or even for anyone who believes (as many of us do) in a legitimately radical patriotism within the various textures and strains of the British national identity.<sup>6</sup> No less inconveniently, especially for historians of British popular culture, we must deal with the fact that Paine castigated Britons (though not the French or Americans) for revelling in parish attachments or 'local prejudices' at the expense of high ideology. There is the further embarrassment that he called upon the United States of America to serve as the sponsor state of a world democratic republic; and that when this plan failed, he trusted his single-state messianism to Napoleon Bonaparte, urging the restless Corsican to invade the British Isles and then to federate, by force of arms, a united states of Europe.

Paine's plans for Britain were short-sighted and misguided (in the opinion of this Canadian interloper), but they do have important implications for some of the great issues facing Britain today. Paine, were he still with us, would have mocked our insistence upon a democratic European Community; and he would have alleged that our concerns about 'loss of sovereignty' were a mere ruse to uphold and preserve British national identities. Further, given his commitment to international free trade and the capitalist market, he would have been out of sympathy with our concerns about the well-being of British workers in a 'Euro,' or ultimately global, capitalist economy. This is all to say that Paine might deserve no monuments at all in Britain, and that existing ones should be gathered together, inscribed 'my country is the world',<sup>7</sup> and re-located to Maastricht, Brussels, Paris and Washington. This would be an extreme measure, but for too long we have side-stepped the delicate issue of Paine's understanding of local, national and international identities, perhaps out of fear that the enquiry will rattle some skeletons in our own ideological closets. This is a disservice to Paine and to our understanding of human allegiances in the 1990s. Our own days, after all, as Paine said of his, are calling all the world's patriots to account.<sup>8</sup>

Thomas Paine had citizenship in three countries: England by birth, the United States and France by virtue of his contributions to their republican revolutions. But Paine put little store in these citizenships, preferring to identify himself as a citizen of the world who held national identifications in contempt. 'My attachment is to all the world,' he declared in 1777, 'and not to any particular part.'<sup>9</sup> Such sentiments were not uncommon during the middle and late decades of the eighteenth century – they were shared by Hume, Voltaire, Condorcet, Gibbon and even Edmund Burke<sup>10</sup> – but Paine stood apart from other cosmopolites in his determination to put internationalism into practice, and after 1789 in his refusal to join the mass exodus, conspicuous in all three of his countries, towards loyalism and conservative nationalism.

It is tempting to think that Paine's internationalism derived from his Quaker inheritance. But the influence of Quakerism upon Paine is difficult to measure, for while it doubtless prompted him towards his later doctrines of equality, liberty and universal benevolence, it did not spare him (as a youth at least) from assuming the superiority of the English over other peoples.<sup>11</sup> A more important source of Paine's early internationalism lies in his involvement with political and scientific debates at Lewes and London during the late 1760s and early 1770s. Paine's contributions at these gatherings focused upon the philosophical and political implications of Newtonian science, which he would praise for its capacity to turn 'the mind from the country to the creation'. At the same time he also became familiar with Locke's argument that nation states were artificial entities made necessary by the depravity of humanity. And though generally identifying with the politics of the Real Whigs, Paine also encountered Country Tory ideals, which doubtless included Lord Bolingbroke's dictum that 'a wise man looks upon himself as a citizen of the world'.<sup>12</sup>

We know for certain that cosmopolitan sentiments reached Paine through his mentor Oliver Goldsmith, whose 'The Traveller' and *Citizen of the World*, much like Bolingbroke's writings in exile, explored the relationship between philosophical cosmopolitanism and local or national attachments.<sup>13</sup> Philosophers and patriots, according to Goldsmith, sought to transcend local and national identities, but as human beings they could not altogether escape attachments to a community and spot of earth that they could call their own:

Such is the patriot's boast, where'er we roam,  
His first country ever is at home.  
And yet, perhaps, if countries we compare,  
And estimate the blessings which they share;  
Though patriots flatter, still shall wisdom find  
An equal portion dealt to all mankind.<sup>14</sup>

Goldsmith, in the end, found local attachments 'unaccountable', but he did

not suggest that they corrupted cosmopolitan thought. The patriot, the Homeric wanderer and the stationary peasant, Goldsmith believed, could not find happiness without some measure of local and national identity.<sup>15</sup> For Paine, however, the struggle between cosmopolitan and local impulses was not as dramatic or soul-wrenching as Goldsmith described. Comfortable with the rational and empirical premises of Lockean politics and Newtonian cosmology, and with an Augustan resolve to elevate Reason over passion, he rejected local and national attachments as marks of emotional and intellectual weakness.

Other philosophic cosmopolitans might have influenced Paine before his departure for America in 1774. We know that he met and corresponded with Benjamin Franklin, who looked upon the young Paine as 'capable' and 'ingenious'.<sup>16</sup> 'Where liberty is, there is my country,' Franklin is said to have remarked; 'where liberty is *not*, there is *my* country' is reputed to be Paine's reply.<sup>17</sup> Cosmopolitan and international ideals might also have reached Paine through Samuel Johnson, who patronized Goldsmith and sometimes shared his interest in world citizenship. Johnson and Franklin, however, were not out of sympathy with local and national attachments: Franklin venerated the New England frontier and Johnson his beloved London. The cosmopolitanism of both thinkers was expendable; Franklin vacillated on his national and international attachments while Johnson varied his definitions of 'patriotism' according to the electoral fortunes of his political friends. Both thinkers, furthermore, discharged their cosmopolitan and international ideals at the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War. Franklin disparaged the British 'character' while Johnson announced his ability to love all mankind 'except an American'.<sup>18</sup>

In New England Paine quickly became a student and admirer of American customs and manners, and at the same time a sharp critic of British ones. The colonists in 1774–5, he observed, had an 'obstinate' attachment to Britain: they 'esteemed the nation'.<sup>19</sup> One of his first purposes in *Common Sense* was to undermine this esteem by exposing the true 'temper' and 'national sins' of the English, whom he accused of pride, credulity, cruelty, and an innate passion for despotism and war.<sup>20</sup> 'Tis the natural temper of the English to fight for a feather,' he declared, 'if they suppose the feather to be an affront'. He also alluded to the 'vulgar and offensive' English language, the 'savageness' of English manners compared with those of the French, the 'unpolished' and 'severe' national character of Britons, and above all the 'local prejudices' of the English – by which he meant the local attachments and sense of place that Goldsmith, and later Edmund Burke, perceived as an acceptable and positive dimension of the human experience.<sup>21</sup>

Even if we allow for the fact that Paine's American writings were consciously cast as anti-British wartime propaganda, he did an injustice to Britons by neglecting to distinguish between the British government,

‘nation’ and ‘people’. The British, as far as Paine was concerned, had one ‘general character’:

[Britain’s] ideas of national honour seem devoid of that benevolence of heart, that universal expansion of philanthropy, and that triumph over the rage of vulgar prejudice, without which man is inferior to himself, and a companion of common animals. To know who she shall regard or dislike, she asks what country they are of, what religion they profess, and what property they enjoy. Her idea of national honour seems to consist in national insult, and that to be a great people, is to be neither a Christian, a philosopher, or a gentleman, but to threaten with the rudeness of a bear, and to devour with the ferocity of a lion.<sup>22</sup>

The King might have deserved this caricature, but some of his leading ministers did not (including the Prime Minister Lord North, who was personally opposed to the war). Moreover, had Paine investigated the British colonial record more closely, he would have discerned in Britain’s administration of French Canada a comparatively enlightened policy of cultural and religious toleration. The striking thing about Paine’s representations of British manners and customs is their abiding elitism, manifested most notably in his contempt for local attachments. When describing the Americans as ‘patriots’ he had in mind their heroic struggle for liberty, equality and independence; when he applied the word to the British he was making pejorative allusion to their parochial cultural identities. The French, for their part, were altogether excused from these grim characteristics: they were ‘philosophers, politicians, and gentlemen’ who prized liberty and common decency. Louis XVI was represented as an enlightened libertarian compared with George III, and the French government was said to behave more benevolently than its British rival towards colonial possessions. The few individual Englishmen whom Paine professed to admire, such as Isaac Newton, were said to owe their greatness to their extraordinary transcendence of the attributes of Englishness.<sup>23</sup>

George III gloried in the name of Britain; Paine did likewise with the mere nomenclature of an independent ‘United States of America’ – a title that Paine himself bestowed upon the new nation. ‘Our great title is Americans,’ he claimed, ‘our citizenship in the United States *is* our national character’.<sup>24</sup> This obsession with American sovereignty as an end in itself goes some way towards compromising Paine’s professed internationalism, especially his declaration that ‘the cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind’.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, in the wake of independence, he encouraged Americans to become a colonial power in their own way, even to the point of insisting that the new nation appropriate the Newfoundland fisheries on the basis of ‘natural right’ (an absurd suggestion that deprived this great phrase of its ideological meaning). Later he would declare his

support for the Louisiana purchase as well as the incorporation of Canada into the United States of America.<sup>26</sup>

It has been said that Paine's *Letter to the Abbé Raynal*, published in 1782, marks his transition from a national to an international thinker.<sup>27</sup> This is true to the extent that the *Letter* appeals for international free trade as well as for a federation of nations to arbitrate international disputes, but at the same time the *Letter* neither abandons American nationalism nor consults the world on the desirability of the new Republic as the sponsor state of a new international order. It was always Paine's belief that 'the principles of universal reformation' could have begun in America alone: its settlers were of many nations, it had diversity in religious practice, while its untamed frontier forced a sort of primeval equality and universal kinship among all inhabitants.<sup>28</sup> But Paine's first object in the *Letter* was to contradict the Abbé's unflattering portrait of American culture and society. Only after defending American manners and morals (a distinctly *national* pitch) did he address the virtues of world citizenship:

The true idea of a great nation, is that which extends and promotes the principles of universal society; whose mind rises above the atmosphere of local thoughts, and considers mankind, of whatever nation or profession they may be, as the work of one Creator.<sup>29</sup>

This declaration, despite its theoretical enlightenment, was intended as a warning to Americans to abandon their own local attachments and to submit to a strong central government. 'Every man in America,' Paine declared, 'stands in a two-fold order of citizenship. He is a citizen of the State he lives in, and of the United States'.<sup>30</sup> Here, by defining citizenship in national terms, Paine linked patriotism to the pursuit of American independence and federalism, and only secondarily to democracy and republicanism.

The oppositional uses of patriotism in eighteenth-century Britain do not have a direct parallel in Paine's American writings.<sup>31</sup> He certainly encouraged the federal and state governments to adopt democratic constitutions, but at the same time he opposed the existence of more than one political party at any level of government – a position which surely would have surprised radical patriots in late eighteenth-century Britain. Moreover, Paine's support for single-party politics did not work to the benefit of American workers; instead it served the interests of the old colonial élite, whose economic power he also reinforced by promoting free trade, by supporting the creation of a national bank, and by denouncing all popular and extra-parliamentary opposition to state and federal authority.<sup>32</sup> This was neither accidental nor temporary, for by the 1790s, when anti-British slogans and natural rights philosophy were insufficient to keep Paine (or any American politician for that matter, including George Washington) above factional politics, he proved more reluctant to support the Jeffersonians – democratic, agrarian and anti-federalist in sympathy – than the oligarchic,

commerce-oriented, pro-federalist, and sometimes even anti-republican faction of Alexander Hamilton.

Paine's politics in the United States do not qualify him as a 'radical patriot'. Radical patriotism in eighteenth-century Britain and America owed much to at least rhetorical sympathy with rural and agrarian virtues. Democracy did not necessarily inhere in these ideals (the eighteenth-century British Country Party believed in political stewardship by independent country gentlemen, not by their workers) but by 1800 the Country Party platform was undergoing democratization at the hands of William Cobbett in England and by Thomas Jefferson in the United States. Paine hinted at this trend in the physiocratic underpinnings of his *Agrarian Justice* and the second part of *Rights of Man*, but he valued the countryside only in so far as it was to finance his welfare programme. Rural people, in Paine's estimation, were inescapably backward in their politics and culture; consequently he designed his radical platform for the towns, and in particular for merchants, whom he perceived as immune from local attachments and as well-placed to conduct the world commerce upon which he built his internationalism. It was always Paine's belief that international trade and commercial freedom were necessary preconditions for the creation of a 'universal civilization', since in his view only a thriving world trade could satisfy the 'mutual wants [that] have formed the individuals of each country into a kind of national society' (people without sophisticated consumer wants, incidentally, he described as 'barbarians'). Thus it was not democratic or republican principles that determined Paine's choices in American (or later French) party politics; his sympathies lay with merchants and industrial entrepreneurs who promoted consumer wants and who shared his belief in the virtue and necessity of an interdependent world order.<sup>33</sup>

\* \* \*

Upon his return to England in 1787 Paine found little support for his approach to internationalism. He faced what might be called an early manifestation of the Falklands syndrome: a series of cultural and political constraints forced upon British radical patriots by the American Revolutionary War.<sup>34</sup> Many British radicals continued to hope for an Anglo-American alliance on account that the two countries shared a similar language, culture and political past,<sup>35</sup> but none of these arguments carried any weight with Paine; he preferred that Americans court the French and thereby further isolate the British. The majority of British reformers rejected this position, partly because of their abiding gallophobia, and partly because they did not share Paine's confidence that the Bourbons were sincere friends of liberty and democracy. Furthermore, there was a disjuncture (though not yet an open disagreement) between Paine and other British radicals regarding the priority to be given to republicanism in the reform struggle. There were also differing interpretations of the English past, especially about the significance of Saxon constitutional precedent.<sup>36</sup>



Paine shared John Cartwright's and Horne Tooke's contempt for the Norman Yoke, but he did not join them in commemorating the ancient constitution or in appealing to an historically-grounded concept of free-born Englishmen. It might be, as Edward Thompson and Gwyn Williams have suggested, that British libertarian traditions were attached to Paine's narrative by his audience,<sup>37</sup> but Paine himself felt no compulsion to wed customary English liberties to the natural rights of man. Prudently, though, Paine made room for such a federation by abandoning his vituperative remarks about British culture, by re-identifying himself as an 'Englishman' (a label he had avoided in the United States) and by announcing his support for the 'hereditary' as well as the 'natural' rights of man.<sup>38</sup>

On the higher perches of British radicalism, where politics was infused with the cosmopolitan discourse of the French Enlightenment, Paine's internationalism was at first an asset. In its address to the French nation the London Corresponding Society looked forward to an alliance 'not of crowns, but of the people of America, France and Britain'. Even the executive of the London Revolution Society – the most aristocratic of the reform associations – identified its members as 'Men, Britons and Citizens of the World'. The Society also announced its disdain for 'national partialities', while honouring the French Revolution as an encouragement to 'other nations to assert the unalienable rights of mankind'.<sup>39</sup> Joseph Priestley, leader of the Constitutional Society in Birmingham, saw in the French Revolution 'the extinction of all national prejudices and enmity', while Richard Price declared that 'love of our country' should not be allowed to discharge Britons from their 'wider obligations as citizens of the world'.<sup>40</sup> These proclamations owed much to Paine, but they were not accompanied by his level of contempt for local attachments or 'prejudices'. Richard Price, one of Paine's closest allies among British radicals, observed in his *Discourse on the Love of Our Country* that patriotism and local attachments were allowable, even noble sentiments. God, Price believed, had endowed humans with a special affection for kin, neighbours and fellow nationals; it was therefore to be expected, in his view, that humans should exercise their benevolence upon those nearest them. Price was even prepared to admit that Britain might be a worthier state than most others, but his great purpose in the *Discourse* was to convince Britons that their country was short of perfection, and that universal benevolence commanded everyone, regardless of station, to recognize the merits of the nationals of other countries.<sup>41</sup> Thus even by conservative definitions of 'patriotism', the *Discourse* was not an anti-patriotic treatise. Edmund Burke, whose *Reflections on the Revolution in France* was conceived as a rejoinder to Price's *Discourse*, did not accuse Price of an undue indulgence of internationalism or of a want of loyalty to Britain – he restricted his objections to Price's arguments that the Glorious Revolution had granted the people a permanent licence to cashier unsatisfactory rulers.<sup>42</sup> But Paine, like Godwin after him, discounted all emotional attachments to Britain, discerning no due reason why a Briton

might prefer his or her country to France or America. It was perhaps a subtle difference from Price's version of world citizenship but a large one, especially when set beside Paine's enlistment of examples of enlightenment and democracy, not from English radical precedent, but from the United States and France.

Paine's dismissal of local and national attachments might have been of limited account to the leading members of the reform societies, but the same cannot be said for the lower reaches of English radicalism, especially after the outbreak of war between England and France in 1793. Popular protests against Paine have generally been attributed to the efficacy of the propaganda of the Pitt government,<sup>43</sup> which in part they were, but in the streets and fields of England, patriotism had long incorporated a profound love of country, as well as a deep respect for the local attachments that Paine so vigorously denounced. Indeed, prior to 1789, an unconditional pride in Britishness was not as evident among Paine's friends in the Whig opposition (especially Fox and Burke, his main political associates on the eve of the Revolution) as it was in the ballads and songs of the British common people.<sup>44</sup> Paine had no knowledge of this level of popular political culture. Instead he gauged the cultural character of the radical movement according to the toasts and speeches of the artisans and gentlemen who dominated the reform associations of London. In September 1789 he informed Thomas Jefferson that

while the multitude here could [formerly] be terrified with the cry and apprehension of arbitrary power, wooden shoe, popery, and such like stuff, they thought themselves extraordinary free people. But the bug-bear now loses its force, and they appear to me to be turning their eyes towards the aristocrats of their own nation.<sup>45</sup>

And so they were, but gallophobia was not as reduced in popular culture as Paine supposed. Working-class English people were prepared to embrace Paine's prescriptions on democracy and natural rights, but on the score of France as the most appropriate model for democratic initiatives, they preferred to reserve judgement.

This is to say that Paine moved too quickly and too abstractly in his condemnation of Burke's *Reflections*. A claim to rule beyond the grave (Paine's representation of Burke's politics) was not necessarily a Tory or reactionary prescription; it could be brought into harmony with natural rights philosophy such as in the nostalgic but ultimately progressive radicalism of William Cobbett. Similarly, Burke's premises about cultural and national identities were too readily discarded by Paine as inimical to the politics of the British common people. A 'nation', Burke observed, is not 'a geographical arrangement' but a 'moral essence' embodied in the aristocracy.<sup>46</sup> The allusion to the aristocracy, needless to say, was unacceptable to British workers and radicals, but many of them were at one with Burke in

understanding a 'nation' as a 'moral essence' rather than a geographic expression. Burke also stood close to the people in his argument that humans identified first and foremost with local and family attachments; and that a nation was constituted when these sentiments and duties were multiplied throughout society. Paine was too quick to reject organic and group-based models of society; he wrongly assumed that they were necessarily hierarchical and incapable of generating or transmitting radical ideals. Richard Price was not of this opinion; indeed his social and political commentary bears a strong resemblance to that of Burke, except that where Burke moved from local to national attachments only (stopping at the level of 'country'),<sup>47</sup> Price carried forward to world or universal identities. It was one thing for Paine to take issue with Burke's stoppage at 'country', but quite another to deny the capacity of radical ideas to evolve out of the British past and to ascend from the cottage to the region, the nation and beyond. Paine, unlike Burke, Price or Goldsmith, did not proceed outward and upward from local and kinship attachments; he hypothesized a generic, inorganic and non-localized 'love for society' and 'system of social affections' that 'begins and ends with our being'.<sup>48</sup> This dismissal of ancestral political precedent and of family or community-based attachments was not acceptable to the British common people. British workers were highly capable of a consciousness of universal society (indeed they still are, despite George Orwell's assurances that British workers 'are not internationally minded'),<sup>49</sup> but this consciousness had to be constructed upon blocks provided by the people's own political traditions, experiences and values, not upon the pure Reason, the ideas and wants of the individual, or the abstract economics suggested by Paine.

Prior to the appearance of the *Reflections*, Paine had looked upon Burke as a fellow internationalist, and more particularly as an ally in the cause of America. But Paine made the mistake of not exploring the local sentiments and pragmatic underpinnings of Burke's earlier internationalism and his apologies for the American colonists. Burke had been an internationalist only to the extent of his commitment to a Europe governed by national elites who shared a common devotion to Christian principles and Stoic traditions. He extended these precepts to New England on the grounds that there was a cultural affiliation between Britons and 'our own European blood and colour' who had settled on the North American continent. 'Abstract ideas of right' and 'general theories of government', Burke had been at pains to point out, were but 'arrant trifling' in justifying an Anglo-American bond. Thus long before 1789 there was an enormous divergence between Burke and Paine on the subject of internationalism and the American Revolutionary War. Paine was moved to support the Americans by his love of American culture, his contempt for Britain, and his dedication to the abstract rights of humanity; Burke's objects, on the other hand, were to ensure the extension of British culture, local attachments and political practices to the new world. The freedom of individuals to 'avail themselves of the general bank and

capital of nations' was perfectly acceptable to Burke so long as the aristocracy was the class served.<sup>50</sup> Thus it should have come as no surprise to Paine that when the French took action against their aristocracy, Burke should call for the 'quarantine' of the French nation, together with a legal lesson for those British radicals who persevered with a 'design of connecting the affairs of France with those in England'.<sup>51</sup>

Burke required only a non-British model of anti-aristocratic politics to incite him to play out his nationalist hand. Paine pretended to be shocked by Burke's gratuitous diatribes against the French as ruthless, sexually-promiscuous and bloody-minded, but this was very little different from the gutter anthropology that Paine himself had earlier applied to the British. Moreover, it is illuminating that he should not have taken issue with Burke's description of the English as a people of great 'simplicity', 'untaught feelings', 'old prejudices' and 'native plainness' – the reason being that Paine agreed with this caricature, recognizing with Burke that these supposed traits were a liability to radicalism in Britain.<sup>52</sup> What Paine should have formally addressed was Burke's argument, which appeared both in the *Reflections* and in *An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs*, that 'we want no foreign examples to rekindle us in the flame of liberty. The example of our ancestors is abundantly sufficient'.<sup>53</sup> Here, by suggesting the sufficiency of English political precedent, Burke undermined his own conservative edifice, though to expose this Paine would have had to mount his radical principles onto the same axis as Burke's model of government: a partnership between the dead, the living, and those not yet born.<sup>54</sup> Later radicals, most notably Cobbett, would do exactly this, chasing Burke according to his own terms of reference by identifying a continuous radical tradition in the British past. Furthermore, an emphasis upon continuity, as many British radicals have discovered over the past two centuries, ceases to be a Tory prescription at the point where it introduces class antagonisms. Paine, however, seldom invoked class in his political theory: like Burke he was accustomed to thinking in terms of a corporate British identity – the effect of which was to obscure Paine's recognition of radical or alternative variants of patriotism and Englishness. A class-based model of the varieties of English patriotism, such as Cobbett later refined, would have allowed Paine to discern many points of confluence among British, French and American workers, which in turn would have allowed him to move from an internationalism based on free trade (and therefore supervised by the bourgeoisie) to a radical political internationalism based upon popular rights and workers' economic interests. Class alignments among the world's workers were not studied by Paine; his internationalism was designed for the culture and economics of the middle class, who in Paine's estimation were free of the local attachments that supposedly preoccupied workers, especially in Britain. Burke's *Reflections*, it seems, convinced Paine more than ever that the British common people were politically debilitated by local and national attachments, and that if radical democracy and republicanism were to take hold in Britain,

they would have to be forced upon the British from without, namely by French revolutionary armies.<sup>55</sup>

\* \* \*

When in the autumn of 1792 Paine hurriedly removed from England to revolutionary France, he was doubtless aware that he had seen the last of his native England. Yet the prospect of permanent exile does not seem to have bothered him, for while he publicly claimed that the people of England were beginning to discharge their 'universal languor', he held out little hope for a domestic revolution in Britain. As he took up residence in France he denounced the tendency of the British reform societies to call upon parliament to reform itself. This was a 'worn-out' and 'hackneyed' approach that would necessarily fail, he argued, 'because no government has a right to alter itself, either in whole or in part'. Only by the means of a national and democratically-elected convention, he believed, could a meaningful reform be realized.<sup>56</sup>

France had such a convention, and Paine himself was elected to it for four departments. It was with no small pride that he accepted these electoral honours, together with the honorary citizenship that had been conferred upon him by the Legislative Assembly. In his speech acknowledging his new citizenship Paine informed his fellow deputies of his delight at seeing 'the barrier broken down that divided patriotism by spots of earth, and limited citizenship to the soil, like vegetation'. Much as he had said of America fifteen years earlier, he declared 'the cause of France to be the cause of all mankind', and restated his quest to forge the world's nations into a 'great Republic of Man'. As a means to this end he called upon France to extend the Revolution 'far beyond the boundaries of her own domains'.<sup>57</sup>

The speech was one of Paine's most eloquent statements on behalf of world citizenship, but it also limited his options in the factional political battles that were beginning to take shape in the Jacobin Club after the August revolt by the *sans-culottes* and the massacres of September. Had his election been to the National or even the Legislative Assembly he could have maintained his preferred transcendence of faction by pitching himself as an international patron of the Revolution, but the ideological dynamics of the Convention did not afford him this opportunity. As one of only two foreigners among the 748 deputies, and as the only one unable to speak or understand French, Paine seems to have felt obliged to rush into ideological alignments before refining his grasp of French affairs. It might be argued, of course, that Paine was not departing from most of his previous teachings – that he supported the leadership of the Brissotins on account of their world citizenship, their policies of economic liberalism, and their commission to export the Revolution abroad. Yet the second part of *Rights of Man*, especially its welfare provisions and appeals for extra-parliamentary activism, were in full accord with the Jacobins' endorsement of popular protest and of government regulation of wages and prices to ease the

burdens of the urban poor. It is here that Paine revealed the disadvantage of his long association with gentlemen reformers, for not until taking his seat in the Convention was he obliged to make a clear declaration for either the moral economy of the *sans-culottes* or the *laissez-faire* of the Brissotins. As the apprentice and son of a staymaker, Paine himself was a *sans-culotte*, but he opted out of the domestic revolution by French artisans and the Jacobins who encouraged them. In April 1793, as the Jacobins were under pressure from the *sans-culottes* to expel the Brissotins from the Convention, Paine identified his Brissotin allies as the best ‘patriots’ in France. After publicly denouncing the ‘prudence’ and ‘morality’ of their Jacobin critics he formally abandoned hope in the capacity of the Revolution to extend liberty throughout Europe and the world.<sup>58</sup>

Paine’s understanding of the French Revolution as a global rather than national concern caused him to despair of the Jacobins, and they of him; ostensibly for reasons of ‘general security’ he was arrested and held in prison for most of 1794.<sup>59</sup> The national citizenships that he had accrued now became liabilities: he was gaoled and voted out of the Convention, not for being a *world* citizen but for being an Englishman. His French citizenship was of no account to the anglophobic Robespierre, while the American minister in Paris, Gouverneur Morris, refused to claim Paine as an American citizen on the grounds that he had forfeited his American citizenship upon taking a seat in the Convention. The consequence for Paine was ten arduous months in the Luxembourg, where in Robespierre’s words, he was detained ‘for the interests of America as well as France’ – that is, lest his writings do further damage to American opinion on the directions of the Revolution.<sup>60</sup> Not until the fall of Robespierre, and the replacement of Morris by James Monroe as American minister, did Paine push his case for release, which took the form of forty pages of legalistic argument on behalf of the legitimacy of his American citizenship. Monroe accepted the argument, secured Paine’s release, and hoped that America’s slow response to Paine’s plight would neither stain nor turn him against ‘our national character’.<sup>61</sup>

The governments of all three of Paine’s nations were responsible for reducing him to seek his personal safety by recourse to a national citizenship. He was exiled from his native England, unwanted in France, and received with public opprobrium upon his return to the United States in 1802, where the legitimacy of his American citizenship remained a matter of dispute. It is often said that it was Paine’s deism, so forcefully expressed in the *Age of Reason*, that did the greatest damage to his reputation during his final years. But more than anything else it was Paine’s cultural and political internationalism that brought him into contempt, and the *Age of Reason* was a part of this internationalism in that it outlined a religion of universal humanity that took no account of national or established churches. The *Age of Reason* was Paine’s last and most heroic attempt to achieve moral and philosophic unity among all humanity, but in the end it cost him much of his

remaining support among professed world citizens, including that of his one-time supporter and fellow resident in America, Joseph Priestley.<sup>62</sup> Paine's decision to publish the *Age of Reason* was perhaps in keeping with his noble principle that he never considered 'whether a thing is *popular* or *unpopular*, but whether it is *right* or *wrong*', yet it is difficult to discern this same principle in his appeal to Napoleon (hardly a worthy custodian of international popular rights) to undertake an invasion of the British Isles – a threat which temporarily united, not surprisingly, both radical and conservative British patriots.<sup>63</sup> In a similar vein Paine continued to promote the territorial expansion of America, still hoping that the United States might volunteer as a sponsor state of a world democratic republic. It is but speculation whether Paine would have approved of America's 'manifest destiny' of the later nineteenth century, or its global imperialism of the twentieth.

\* \* \*

The English radical tradition would seem to oblige us to choose between one of two versions of radicalism: the world citizenship of Thomas Paine or the steadfast Englishness of William Cobbett. Yet for all the differences between these two great radicals it is worth remembering that it was Cobbett – who had once consigned Paine's 'carcass' to everlasting perdition, and who prophesied that the world would come to express 'all that is base, malignant, treacherous, unnatural and blasphemous, by the single monosyllable *Paine*' – who would later resurrect Paine's 'carcass' and transport it back to England for the edification and unification of the English radical movement.<sup>64</sup> The lesson provided by Cobbett's nocturnal disinterment, and by his confession that at Paine's 'expiring flambeau I lighted my taper',<sup>65</sup> is that internationalism and Englishness are perhaps not as irreconcilable as might at first appear.

It was the democratic and republican spirit of *Rights of Man* that initially propelled Cobbett towards radicalism, but during the 1790s he migrated towards anti-Jacobinism, taking violent exception to almost everything that Paine admired: republicanism, democracy, deism, even the French and American 'characters'. Yet it was Paine's writings that drew Cobbett's attention to that leviathan of abuses that the *Political Register* would come to designate as 'Old Corruption': borough-mongering, paper money and unmerited pensions and sinecures. Cobbett also attributed to Paine the awakening of 'a spirit of enquiry' among the people that made his own political task that much easier.<sup>66</sup> The two men diverged in method: Paine invoked political theories and natural rights with great certainty and confidence, embroidering his theories with empirical illustrations. Cobbett worked in opposite fashion; he used political theory to supplement and punctuate his empirical commentary on the daily experiences of working people. Cobbett did not pretend to approve of Paine's economic liberalism, his doctrinal republicanism, his freethought, his support for the Napoleonic

invasion, or his enthusiasm for commerce and manufacturing. Patriotism and Englishness, Cobbett believed (and in this he was closer to Burke than to Paine), dwelt in the traditional experiences and customs of rural folks, who to his mind had a native antipathy towards the commercial and industrial capitalism that Paine so admired. Whereas Paine was comfortable with the charter Jacobinism of the 1790s, the urban domination of the radical platform, and the progress theories of the European Enlightenment, Cobbett based his radicalism upon English precedent, an anglicized version of Jacobinism, and a firm belief in a superior life in the English past. Further, Cobbett believed that local attachments were not a liability to the development of a radical political consciousness, which to his mind proceeded from the cottage fireside to the village community and on to the radical platform of the nation. There, for Cobbett, as for Burke, radicalism stopped, for as he remarked in the inaugural pamphlet of his anti-Jacobin career, and believed always: 'a man of all countries is a man of no country . . . he who has been a bad subject in his own country . . . will neither be trusted nor respected'.<sup>67</sup> Leftward gravitation in politics and economics did not alter his opinion. 'I am no citizen of the world', he boasted in an essay on the nationalist struggles in Poland in 1831,

It is quite enough for me to think about what is best for England, Scotland and Ireland. I do not like those whose philanthropy is so enlarged as to look, as Rousseau said, to Tartary for objects of affection and commiseration . . . [The country of Poland] is too distant, too out of the way of our affairs, that we would take one single meal from a weaver or ploughman for the sake of doing good to the Poles.<sup>68</sup>

These words would have distressed Paine, not because he looked upon internationalism as a dogma, or was uncaring about oppression close at hand, but because he refused to apply boundaries – national, geographic or racial – to his universal benevolence. Black slavery, so chauvinistically condoned by Cobbett, was thoroughly denounced by Paine, even to the face of his hallowed Americans.<sup>69</sup> It might well be that Paine spread his humanity too thin, but it possessed a latitude and inclusiveness that Cobbett's did not.

Here lies our dilemma. The historiographical commission of History Workshop, as Raphael Samuel reminds us, is at least 'notionally' internationalist; our ideal is to state confidently with Marx that 'I am a citizen of the world'.<sup>70</sup> At the same time, however, we are not betraying or even diluting our international ideals by recognizing (again with Marx) that Cobbett, perhaps more than Paine, was 'a plebeian by instinct and sympathy'.<sup>71</sup> Plebeian experiences, as Marx knew and discerned in Cobbett, give rise to local attachments that require our respect and consideration, not our condescension or dismissal. Cobbett rightly showed the error in the assumptions of Paine and Burke that a conservative version of patriotism is a necessary consequence of cultural and emotional attachments to family,



parish and community; but most instructively of all, he did not see Paine's internationalism as a contradiction of his own brand of Englishness. 'Let this be considered', he said of his resurrection of Paine's bones:

the act of the *reformers of England, Scotland, and Ireland*. In their name we opened the grave, and in their name will the tomb be raised. We do not look upon ourselves as adopting *all* Paine's opinions upon *all* subjects. He was a *great man*, an *Englishman*, a *friend of freedom*, and the *first and greatest enemy of the Borough and Paper system*. This is enough for us.

Upon returning to England Cobbett found little support for his public subscription to erect a bronze statue in honour of Paine's memory; nor was there great support for his macabre plan to manufacture jewellery containing lockets of Paine's hair. Quietly at his farmhouse (not unlike us during the bicentenary of *Rights of Man*) Cobbett slid the coffin beneath his bed, consoling himself with the hope that Paine would eventually be redeemed by 'the *healing hand of time*'.<sup>72</sup>

The bones are now lost, and so are we in determining Paine's place in the pantheon of the British and international Left. The author of *Rights of Man* was not consistent in his management of nationalism and internationalism; he was also too dismissive of the parochial attachments and regional and national identities that were (and indeed remain) inalienable from the high ideology of British popular radicalism. Yet it might well be that Paine obliges us to re-think some of our current constructions of the British, especially English, national identity. For while it is sometimes tempting to look upon Paine as un-English or anti-English, we must remember that it was Cobbett – a proud Englishman and stern critic of internationalism – who identified Paine, not as a traitor or as an adversary of Englishness, but as a 'great man, an Englishman'.

## NOTES

1 *Thomas Paine Society Newsletter*, Autumn 1990, p. 3.

2 *Guardian*, 5 September 1992, p. 39.

3 *Common Sense*, 1776, in *The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine*, 2 vols., ed. Philip S. Foner, New York, 1945, I, p. 45. Hereafter cited as *Writings*.

4 'Excerpts from *Common Sense*, New Rochelle, N.Y., 1987.

5 Leo Zonneveld (ed.), *Humanity's Quest for Unity* (forthcoming publication by the United Nations of talks and papers delivered at U.N. Paine symposium, December 1987).

6 See especially Raphael Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity*, 3 vols., London, 1989; Hugh Cunningham, 'The Language of Patriotism, 1750–1914', *History Workshop* 12, Autumn 1981, pp. 8–33; Linda Colley, 'Whose Nation? Class and National Consciousness in Britain, 1750–1830', *Past and Present* 113, November 1986, pp. 97–117; David Eastwood, 'Patriotism and the English State in the 1790s', in Mark Philp (ed.), *The French Revolution and British Popular Politics*, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 146–165; Simon During, 'Literature – Nationalism's other?', in Homi Bhabha (ed.), *Nation and Narration*, London, 1990, pp. 138–153; Anthony Smith, *National Identity*, Harmondsworth,

1991, ch. 4; Otto Dann, 'Introduction', in Otto Dann and John Dinwiddy (eds.), *Nationalism in the Age of the French Revolution*, London, 1988, pp. 1–11; John Dinwiddy, 'England', in *ibid.*, pp. 53–70; Peter Alter, *Nationalism*, London, 1985, ch. 1; Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge, 1990, ch. 3; J. H. Grainger, *Patriotisms: Britain, 1900–1939*, London, 1986, ch. 1; John Schwarzmantel, *Socialism and the Idea of Nation*, London, 1991, ch. 3; Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Oxford, 1983, ch. 1; Gerald Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History, 1740–1830*, New York, 1987.

7 *Rights of Man*, 1791–2, part II, ch. 5.

8 *American Crisis* I, 1776, *Writings*, I, p. 50.

9 *American Crisis* VII, 1778, *Writings*, I, p. 146.

10 See Thomas Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought*, London, 1977, esp. chs. 1–3; Derek Heater, *Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education*, London, 1990, chs. 1–2.

11 *American Crisis* VII, 1778, *Writings*, I, p. 143; *Common Sense*, 1776, *Writings*, I, p. 4. On Paine and Quakerism see Gregory Claeys, *Thomas Paine: Social and Political Thought*, Boston, 1989, esp. pp. 101–4; Robert Falk, 'Thomas Paine and the Attitude of the Quakers to the American Revolution', *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 63, July 1939, pp. 302–10; David Wilson, *Paine and Cobbett: The Transatlantic Connection*, Montreal and Kingston, 1988, pp. 14–15.

12 *American Crisis* VII, 1780, *Writings*, I, p. 164; Lord Bolingbroke, *Reflections on Exile*, ca. 1716, in *Lord Bolingbroke: The Political Writings of Henry St. John*, London, n.d., p. 127.

13 Paine's earliest extant letter, dated December 1772, is addressed to Goldsmith. See *Writings*, II, pp. 1129–30.

14 Oliver Goldsmith, 'The Traveller, or a Prospect of Society', 1764, in *Collected Works of Oliver Goldsmith*, 4 vols., ed. Arthur Friedman, Oxford, 1966, IV, p. 251, 251n..

15 *Ibid.*, p. 263; 'To the Author of the *Royal Magazine*', 1760, in *Collected Works*, III, p. 85; *The Citizen of the World*, 1760, London, third edn., 1774, letter cxxi. See also Alan McKillop, 'Local Attachment and Cosmopolitanism – The Eighteenth-Century Pattern', in Frederick Hilles and Harold Bloom (eds.), *From Sensibility to Romanticism: Essays Presented to Frederick A. Pottle*, New York, 1965, pp. 200–4; Smith, *National Identity*, pp. 4–5.

16 Paine to Benjamin Franklin, 4 March 1775, *Writings*, II, pp. 1130–2; David Freeman Hawke, *Paine*, New York, 1974, pp. 20–1.

17 Claeys, *Paine*, p. 22. The story is probably apocryphal, but it does not compromise the internationalist tenets of either thinker. See Schlereth, *Cosmopolitan Ideal*, p. 208n.; A. O. Aldridge, *Man of Reason: The Life of Thomas Paine*, Philadelphia, 1959, pp. 169, 334.

18 *Collected Works of Oliver Goldsmith*, ed. Friedman, IV, pp. 236–7; Boswell's *Life of Johnson*, ed. Frank Brady, New York, 1968 edn, p. 461.

19 *American Crisis* VII, 1778, *Writings*, I, p. 143.

20 *Common Sense*, 1776, *Writings*, I, pp. 8–9; *American Crisis* VII, 1778, *Writings*, I, pp. 143–7.

21 *American Crisis* III, 1777, *Writings*, I, pp. 82; *American Crisis* II, 1777, *Writings*, I, pp. 66, 70–2; *American Crisis* VI, 1778, *Writings*, I, pp. 131, 137.

22 *American Crisis* VII, 1778, *Writings*, I, p. 147.

23 *American Crisis* VI, 1778, *Writings*, I, pp. 153–4; *American Crisis* VII, 1778, *Writings*, I, pp. 161, 164.

24 *American Crisis*, XIII, 1783, *Writings*, I, p. 234.

25 Introduction to *Common Sense*, 1776, *Writings*, I, p. 3.

26 'Peace and the Newfoundland Fisheries', 1779, *Writings*, II, p. 188.

27 Darrel Abel, 'The Significance of the Letter to the Abbé Raynal in the Progress of Thomas Paine's Thought', *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* LXVI, April 1942, p. 177; *Letter to the Abbé Raynal*, 1782, *Writings*, II, pp. 211–263.

28 *Rights of Man*, 1791–2, Harmondsworth, 1969, pp. 181–2 (all subsequent references are to this edition); *To the People of England on the Invasion of England*, 1804, *Writings*, II, pp. 675–7.

29 *Letter to the Abbé Raynal*, 1782, *Writings*, II, p. 256.

30 *Six Letters to Rhode Island*, letter II, 1782, *Writings*, II, p. 345.

31 See Colley, 'Whose Nation?', pp. 97–117; Cunningham, 'Language of Patriotism', pp. 8–33.

32 *Prospects on the Rubicon*, 1787, *Writings*, II, pp. 623–651; *Dissertations on Government; the Affairs of the Bank; and Paper Money*. . . , 1786, *Writings*, II, pp. 368–414.

33 *Letter to the Abbé Raynal*, 1782, *Writings*, II, pp. 240–1; *Rights of Man*, pp. 185–9, 234–8. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between Paine's cosmopolitanism and political economy see Gregory Claeys, 'Reciprocal Dependence, Virtue and Progress: Some Sources of Early Socialist Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism in Britain, 1750–1850', in Frits von Holthoon and Marcel van der Linden (eds.), *Internationalism in the Labour Movement, 1830–1940*, Leiden, 1988, esp. pp. 236–42; Claeys, *Paine*, pp. 55–6; Claeys, 'Republicanism versus Commercial Society: Paine, Burke, and the French Revolution Debate,' *Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History* 54: 3, Winter 1989, pp. 4–13. See also Eric Foner, *Tom Paine and Revolutionary America*, New York, 1976, ch. 5. Burke remarked that 'government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants': *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, 1790, Harmondsworth, 1968, p. 151. All subsequent references to the *Reflections* are to this edition.

34 Linda Colley, 'Radical Patriotism in Eighteenth-Century England', in Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism I*, pp. 169–187.

35 Colin Bonwick, *English Radicals and the American Revolution*, Chapel Hill, 1977, ch. 6.

36 See John Belchem, 'Republicanism, Popular Constitutionalism and the Radical Platform in Early Nineteenth-Century England', *Social History* 6: 1, (January 1981), esp. pp. 1–3; Albert Goodwin, *Friends of Liberty: The English Democratic Movement in the Age of the French Revolution*, London, 1979, pp. 171–207.

37 *Rights of Man*, pp. 93–4; E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, Harmondsworth, 1968, ch. 5, esp. pp. 94–6; G. A. Williams, *Artisans and Sans-Culottes: Popular Movements in France and Britain during the French Revolution*, London, 1968, pp. 13–18. See also John Stevenson, '"Paineities to a Man"?: The English Popular Radical Societies in the 1790s', *Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History* 54: 3, Winter 1989, pp. 14–25.

38 *Address and Declaration at a Select Meeting of the Friends of Universal Peace and Liberty . . .*, 1791, *Writings*, II, p. 534.

39 Goodwin, *Friends of Liberty*, pp. 250, 110–11.

40 Joseph Priestley, *Letters to the Honourable Edmund Burke Occasioned by his Reflections on the Revolution in France*, Birmingham, third edn, 1791, pp. 143–7; Richard Price, *A Discourse on the Love of our Country*, London, fourth edn, 1790, p. 10.

41 Price, *Discourse*, pp. 2–10; D. O. Thomas, *The Honest Mind: The Thought and Work of Richard Price*, Oxford, 1977, pp. 298–9. See also William Stafford, 'Religion and the Doctrine of Nationalism in England at the Time of the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars', in Stuart Mews (ed.), *Religion and National Identity*, Oxford, 1982, pp. 381–4.

42 Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, pp. 93–120.

43 For an excellent discussion of the traditional interpretations of popular loyalism see Alan Booth, 'English Popular Loyalism and the French Revolution', *Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History* 54: 3, Winter 1989, pp. 26–31. See also H. T. Dickinson, 'Popular Conservatism and Militant Loyalism 1789–1815', in H. T. Dickinson (ed.), *Britain and the French Revolution 1789–1815*, London, 1989, pp. 104–25; Clive Emsley, 'Revolution, War and the Nation State: the British and French Experiences 1789–1801', in Philp (ed.), *The French Revolution and British Popular Politics*, pp. 99–117; Clive Emsley, 'An Aspect of Pitt's "Terror": Prosecutions for Sedition during the 1790s', *Social History* 6: 2 (May 1981), pp. 155–184; Frank O'Gorman, 'Pitt and the "Tory" Reaction to the French Revolution 1789–1815', in Dickinson (ed.), *Britain and the French Revolution*, pp. 21–38.

44 See the Madden Collection of Ballads (Cambridge University Library), especially vol. V.

45 Paine to Thomas Jefferson, 18 September 1789, *Writings*, II, p. 1296. See also *Rights of Man*, p. 230.

46 Seamus Deane, *The French Revolution and Enlightenment in England, 1789–1832*, London, 1988, p. 29.

47 Edmund Burke, *An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs*, 1791, New York, 1962, pp. 97–9.

48 *Rights of Man*, p. 185.

49 George Orwell, 'The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius' (1940), in *The Penguin Essays of George Orwell*, Harmondsworth, 1968, p. 173.

50 Edmund Burke, *Speech on Moving his Resolutions for Conciliation with the Colonies*, 1775, in Burke, *Selected Writings and Speeches*, ed. Peter Stanlis, New York, 1963, p. 154; Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, p. 183.

- 51 Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, pp. 91, 185.
- 52 *Ibid.*, pp. 181–3, 244, 248–9, 251, 172, 186.
- 53 Burke, *Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs*, p. 133.
- 54 Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, p. 195.
- 55 *Letter Addressed to the Addressers on the Late Proclamation*, 1792, *Writings*, II, pp. 496–511; *The Eighteenth Fructidor*, 1797, *Writings*, II, p. 608.
- 56 *Letter Addressed to the Addressers on the Late Proclamation*, pp. 478, 499–501, 504, 510.
- 57 *Address to the People of France*, 1792, *Writings*, II, pp. 538–40.
- 58 Paine to George Jacques Danton, 1793, *Writings*, II, pp. 1335–8; Paine to Thomas Jefferson, 20 April 1793, *Writings*, II, pp. 1330–1; Hawke, *Paine*, pp. 256–90.
- 59 Moncure Conway, *The Life of Thomas Paine*, 2 vols., New York, 1892, II, pp. 104–7; *The Age of Reason*, 1794, *Writings*, I, pp. 512–3.
- 60 *To the Citizens of the United States*, 1802–3, letter II, *Writings*, II, pp. 919–20; Hawke, *Paine*, p. 299. On the apparent complicity of Morris in keeping Paine in gaol see George Spater, 'Introduction' in Ian Dyck (ed.), *Citizen of the World: Essays on Thomas Paine*, London, 1987, p. 9; Paine to Gouverneur Morris, 24 February 1794, *Writings*, II, pp. 1338–9; Paine to James Monroe, 1 August 1794, *Writings*, II, pp. 1341–2.
- 61 James Monroe to Edmund Randolph, 7 November 1794, *Writings of James Monroe*, II, New York, 1899, p. 106; Paine to James Monroe, 10 September 1794, *Writings*, II, pp. 1345–54; Paine to James Monroe, 20 October 1794, *Writings*, II, pp. 1364–74; *Letter to George Washington*, 1796, *Writings*, II, pp. 690, 695–7, 701.
- 62 Joseph Priestley, *An Answer to Mr. Paine's Age of Reason*, Northumberland, 1794, *passim*.
- 63 *Six Letters to Rhode Island*, letter V, 1783, *Writings*, II, p. 360; *To the People of England on the Invasion of England*, 1804, *Writings*, II, pp. 675–683.
- 64 William Cobbett, *Life of Thomas Paine*, 1796, *Porcupine's Works*, 12 vols., London, 1800, IV, pp. 112–3; Cobbett's *Political Register*, 18 September 1819, pp. 131–2; 13 November 1819, pp. 382–4.
- 65 Cobbett's *Political Register*, 18 December 1819, p. 472.
- 66 *Ibid.*, 27 January 1820, pp. 736–7, 779–83; 21 December 1822, pp. 707–10.
- 67 *Observations on the Emigration of Joseph Priestley*, 1794, *Porcupine's Works*, I, p. 169.
- 68 Cobbett's *Political Register*, 20 August 1831, p. 495.
- 69 *African Slavery in America*, 1775, *Writings*, II, pp. 16–19; *A Serious Thought*, 1775, *Writings*, II, pp. 19–20.
- 70 Raphael Samuel, 'Preface', in Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism*, I, p. xii; Marx to Paul Lafargue, n.d., cited in S. S. Praver, *Karl Marx and World Literature* (Oxford, 1977), title-page.
- 71 *The New-York Daily Tribune*, 22 July 1853, p. 5.
- 72 Cobbett's *Political Register*, 19 February 1820, pp. 46–52; 8 September 1821, pp. 547–50; 15 September 1821, pp. 593–5.